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Maria Lucia de Paula Oliveira, Rio de Janeiro / Brazil 
 
Law, Environmental Policy and Kantian Philosophy 
 
Abstract: Are Kantian philosophy and its principle of respect for persons inadequate to the protection 
of environmental values? This paper answers this question by elucidating how Kantian ethics can take 
environmental values seriously. In the period that starts with the Critique of Judgment in 1790 and 
ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject would have been approached by Kant in a 
different manner; although the respect that we may owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our 
duties to mankind, the basis for such respect stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to 
preserve nature lies in our duties to ourselves.  Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by 
Gillroy (the reference is to a conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency 
or  utility),  Kantian  philosophy  can  offer  a  better  explanation  of  the  relationship  between 
environmental policy and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that 
protects the moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics 
of Morals.  In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That means 
it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus. 
Keywords: Environment. Kant. Philosophy. Values. Law. Nature. Policies.Justice. State. Mankind 
 
I. Introduction 
Are  Kantian  philosophy  and  its  core  principle  of  respect  for  persons  inadequate  to  the 
protection of environmental values? This  paper answers this  question by elucidating how 
Kantian ethics can take environmental values seriously.   In the period that starts with the 
Critique of Judgment in 1790 and ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject 
would have been approached by Kant in a different manner; although the respect that we may 
owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our duties to mankind, the basis for such respect 
stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to preserve nature lies in our duties to 
ourselves.  Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy (the reference is to a 
conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency or utility), Kantian 
philosophy can offer a better explanation of the relationship between environmental policy 
and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that protects the 
moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics of 
Morals.  In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That 
means it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus. 2 
Firstly, I would like to show how Kantian moral philosophy is not only compatible with 
duties in relation to nature, but it also explicitly acknowledges such duties. This is achieved 
without the principle that mankind, as the objective of moral action, is put into question. 
Secondly, I am going to analyze Kant’s legal and political philosophy, especially with a focus 
on its relevance to the role of the State, of public institutions, in the adoption of intervention 
policies  that  are  non-paternalist.  It  has  been  claimed,  and  rightly  so,  that  Kant’s  liberal 
philosophy  is  compatible  with  the  Welfare  State.  The  aim  here  is  to  show  how  Kantian 
philosophy can be an asset in the moral and political grounding of public policies on the 
environment. 
 
II. Kantian ethics and environmental values 
One can find in  Kantian philosophy an important  redefinition of the value of nature and 
mankind’s duty toward it. In some early works, such as his Lectures on Ethics, Kant, quoting 
Baumgarten, says these duties are indirect and stem from duties to mankind. However, Kant 
does  not  yet  develop  a  conception  of  his  own.  Later,  in  the  period  that  begins  with  the 
publishing of the Critique of Judgment and culminates with the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
proposes a foundation that was very different from the one featured in the moral philosophy 
of that time, since the foundation ceases to be the usefulness of fruits, animals and plants, as 
in Hume. Kant claims that the foundation is nature’s aesthetic properties  – the beauty of 
natural forms. It should also be noted that the duty to preserve natural beauty does not arise 
from  our  duties  to  others,  but  from  duties  to  ourselves,  our  duty  to  cultivate  our  moral 
disposition
1. 
The text that explains this shift in the grounding of duties towards nature is certainly the 
Doctrine of Virtue, which appears in the second part of The Metaphysics of Morals. This is 
the work where Kant distinguishes nature-related duties and duties to nature. 
A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human beings; and if he 
thinks he has such duties, it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of reflection, and his 
supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this misunderstanding by 
mistaking his duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings. 
2 
Kant is concerned, then, with duties that are grounded on morality’s supreme principle, 
whereby mankind is seen also as an end, and not just as a means. Such duties do not concern 
nature primarily, but have implications for it. In §17, Kant shows how these nature-related 
duties can be man’s duties to himself: 
                                                           
1 Paul Guyer, Kant and The Experience of Freedom,1993. 
2Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals,1996, 6:442. 3 
A  propensity  to  wanton  destruction  of  what  is  beautiful  in  inanimate  nature  (spiritus 
destructionis) is opposed to man’s duty to himself; for it weakens or uproots that feeling in man 
which,  though  not  of  itself  moral,  is  still  a  disposition  of  sensibility  that  greatly  promotes 
morality or at least prepares the way for it: the disposition, namely, to love something (e.g., 
beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of plants) even apart from any intention to 
use it. 
With  regard  to  the  animate  but  non  rational  part  of  creation,  violent  and  cruel  treatment  of 
animals is far more intimately opposed to man´s duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain 
from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their pain and so weakens and gradually uproots a 
natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one´s relations with other men. Man 
is authorized to kill animals quickly (without pain) and to put them to work that does not strain 
them beyond their capacities (such work as man himself must submit to). But agonizing physical 
experiments for the sake of mere speculation, when the end could also be achieved without these, 
are to be abhorred. Even gratitude for the long service of an old horse or dog (just as if they were 
members  of  the  household)  belongs  indirectly  to  man’s  duty  with  regard  to  these  animals; 
considered as a direct duty, however, it is always only a duty of man to himself.
3 
The excerpt above makes it clear that nature-related duties are duties of man to himself, 
for nature activates sensitivity to beauty, which can lead to a moral disposition. As far as the 
vegetal and mineral realms are concerned, there is a clear matter of beauty, not usefulness, 
driving our duties. Some brief considerations on the relations between judgments of beauty 
and moral disposition in Kantian philosophy, especially the Third Critique, are called for here. 
For Kant, the beautiful is a symbol of morality, for the experience of the beautiful is felt 
as an experience of freedom: the freedom of imagination is taken as a symbolic representation 
of the freedom of choice which is essential to morality. Yet while freedom of choice is solely 
represented by concepts, freedom (free play) of imagination is felt; this implies a sensible 
representation which in turn may symbolize an object of pure reason that is not able to be 
intuitively thought of, as is the object of morality
4. Nevertheless, Kant certainly values the 
sublime as a symbolic representation of the good; this is so because the feeling towards the 
sublime in nature couldn’t be thought of without a connection with a moral disposition. As 
explained by Paul Guyer, we could say that beauty and sublimity symbolize different aspects 
of human autonomy. Freedom of imagination in experiencing beauty would represent the 
potential that we have for being free of the determinisms of impulses and inclinations, while 
the most painful experiences of the sublime would remind us that we will only reach our 
potential for freedom by rigorous submission of our most human inclinations to the principle 
                                                           
3 See Kant (note 2), 6:442. 
4 Paul Guyer, Kant and The Experience of Freedom, 2000, 252. 4 
of pure practical reason
5. Aesthetic experiences have a direct influence on our affections and 
inclinations, with an evident symbolic meaning. Moral knowledge also plays a role, even 
though this may not and ought not to be translated into a reduction and confusion of the 
beautiful and the sublime towards the good and vice versa. More over, in the  Doctrine of 
Virtue the philosopher mentions a true ethical duty to preserve natural beauty and to seek 
natural  perfection.  Then  would  it  be  possible  to  have  sublimity  and  beauty  that  are 
intellectual, in other words, sublimity and beauty not founded on the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure? This would only be possible if we were pure intelligences and if in the aesthetic 
judgment there weren’t the necessity of an interest for sensibility, which would rupture the 
purity of such a judgment. He also reminds us that the object of pure intellectual complacency 
which is also unconditional is the moral law and its power over us, and this power can only be 
aesthetically known through sacrifice. Thus we have the compatibility between the aesthetic 
and moral judgments. 
From  this  it  follows  that  the  intellectual,  intrinsically  purposive  (moral)  good,  judged 
aesthetically, must not be represented so much as beautiful rather as sublime, so that it arouses 
more the feeling of respect (which scorns charm) than that of love in the intimate affection, since 
human nature does not agree with that good of its own accord, but only through the dominion that 
reason exercises over sensibility. Conversely, even that which we call sublime in nature outside 
us or even without ourselves (e.g., certain effects) is represented only as a power of the mind to 
soar above certain obstacles of sensibility by means of moral principles, and thereby to become 
interesting. 
6 
It is also important to stress that nature-related duties are not linked to the needs or 
claims of other people, but to duties related to one’s own moral development. Such duties 
appear  as  perfect  duties  to  ourselves  as  moral  beings.  This  means  a  demand  for  what  is 
valuable  for  themselves  in  the  process  of  preserving  or  improving  the  capacity  to  act  as 
rational subjects, while forbidding all that is contrary to this purpose. As a perfect duty, in 
Kantian terms, the form is that of a negative duty; these negative duties forbid men to act 
against nature and are about self-preservation only, not improvement. As Paul Guyer shows, 
this classification comes from Kant considering such duty as a given in our moral disposition. 
Still,  this  does  not  preclude  the  acknowledgment  of  a  duty  to  develop  it  through  the 
improvement of the same disposition towards others. In any case, the constitution of this duty 
as a negative or perfect one gives it undeniable strength, since it means in the Kantian system 
that it must always be prioritized over other duties; no other duty, such as human development 
                                                           
5See Guyer (note 4), 253. 
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 2000, 5:271.  5 
itself, can ever be mentioned to make it relative. Thus, one must come to the rather curious 
conclusion that the nature-related duty in question is both indirect and perfect. This means no 
autonomous agent is exempted. 
By considering the acknowledgement of nature-related duties featured on Kant’s work, 
one can immediately refute the claim that the anthropocentric character of Kantian theory 
implies the denial of all ethical duties that concern environmental issues. Kant sees nature as 
having  an  important  role  in  strengthening  mankind`s  worth  through  the  ability  to  grasp 
beauty.  Nature  enhances  individual  autonomy,  and  that  shapes  preferences  in  a  way  that 
favors moral law. Even if this means a kind of instrumentalism in the use of nature, it is non-
consequentialist; it is linked to a broader duty to search for moral improvement and justice in 
society. Indeed, disrespecting nature reveals a lack of perception of the best features of human 
beings. The second part of the Critique of Judgment, the Critique of Theological Judgment, is 
a relevant text in this context. There, Kant reminds us that nature as a whole can be seen as a 
final cause only relative to mankind’s moral aim. In other words, nature as a whole is seen as 
a final cause only when the unlimited aim of human freedom is aimed at. The only end to 
which nature can be subordinated is mankind, but a mankind that is morally valuable because 
of its freedom, not a mankind where another value is put into perspective (with an interest that 
is not the moral one): 
Now we have in the world beings of but one kind whose causality is teleological, or directed to 
ends, and which at the same time are beings of such a character that the law according to which 
they have to determine ends for themselves is represented by them as unconditioned and not 
dependent on anything in nature, but as necessary in itself. The being of this kind is man, but man 
regarded as noumenon. He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective characterization 
is nevertheless such as to enable us to recognize in him a supersensible faculty – his freedom…
7 
The groundings for ethical duties to the environment are not usefulness, economic value 
or human preferences, but – through the judgment of natural beauty, which has no purpose 
but  to  appreciate the form  of that which is  beautiful  – the affirmation of people`s  moral 
autonomy. It is not absurd, in this context, to suppose that nature should be protected by law. 
This would facilitate the free coexistence of different people. 
Finally, it would be good to get back to Kant’s philosophy, based on the same principle 
of mankind as an end, to dismiss the criticism that Kantian thought does not take future 
generations into consideration. François Ost rightly claims that Kant’s concept of mankind 
expresses a demand for the universal which is not restricted to a logical generalization, as the 
categorical imperative’s form is often interpreted; a process of actual logical universalization 
                                                           
7  See Kant (Note 6), 5:435-6. 6 
is involved also. This process involves a “natural skill” that leads mankind to look ever deeper 
for its moral condition: 
I shall therefore be allowed to assume that, since the human race is constantly advancing with 
respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived as progressing toward what is 
better with respect to the moral end of its existence, and that this will indeed be interrupted from 
time to time but will never be broken off. I do not need to prove this presupposition; it is up to its 
adversary to prove (his) case. For I rest my case on my innate duty, the duty of every member of 
the series of generations – to which I (as a human being in general) belong and am yet not so 
good in the moral character required of me as I ought to be and hence could be – so to influence 
posterity  that  it  becomes  always  better  (the  possibility  of  this  must,  accordingly,  also  be 
assumed), and to do it in such a way that this duty may be legitimately handed down from one 
member [in the series of generations to another.
8 
The  idea  of  mankind  as  expressed  above  presupposes  that  man  has  an  open-ended 
capacity  of  self-improvement,  and  this  capacity  will  influence  future  generations.  This 
improvement, though, is not random, as Ost reminds us. It involves the natural state and then 
creates  the  civil  state,  where  a  just  political  Constitution  must  exist.  The  notion  of  a 
cosmopolitan law followed. Here, Kant did not mean to establish an obligation relative to 
future generations, but this conception could give us the basis for just  such an obligation 
today. In fact, Kant himself derives practical consequences from the concept of mankind, as 
far as international relations are concerned. In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant, while defending 
the legal right of universal hospitality among peoples – defined as the right of a foreigner not 
be treated with hostility when arriving in a country that is not his own  (and this right comes 
from common property of the Earth’s original surface) – stresses that the visitor’s right does 
not go beyond that: 
If one compares with this the inhospitable behavior of civilized, especially commercial, states in 
our part of the world, the injustice they show in visiting foreign lands and peoples (which with 
them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro 
countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape and so forth were discovered, they were, to them, countries 
belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants as nothing. 
9           
In Towards Perpetual Peace, Kant lays down the foundations of a cosmopolitan law over 
the concept of an equitable sharing of resources and the peaceful occupation of the available 
spaces, which is to occur under the rule of common law, as François Ost reminds us. The idea 
of  mankind  would  effectively  extend  to  the  whole  of  humankind  from  a  synchronic 
                                                           
8 Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: That may be correct in Theory, in Practical Philosophy, 1996, 8:308-
9. 
9 Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, in Practical Philosophy, 1996, 8:358-9. 7 
viewpoint. But would the same notion of mankind not be open to considerations related to the 
moral interests of future generations?  Cosmopolitan law would lead both to respect of rights 
acquired by past  inhabitants  and the acknowledgment of the  rights  of  future  generations. 
Dilapidation  of  natural  resources  to  the  point  of  risking  the  very  existence  of  future 
generations  is  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  mankind  discussed  above.  This  is  the  case 
because destroying the natural world is against the categorical imperative, which obliges one 
to respect mankind as it manifests on others, not only as a means, but also as an end. As Ost 
tells us, it may be the case that this subject is not present in Kant’s writing because the effects 
of ecological imbalance had not become apparent in the eighteenth century.  
In any case, we have already hinted at a legal, and not just ethical, duty to protect the 
environment. But the constitution of this legal duty and its role in the political society is 
something that needs elaboration. Thus, a Kantian inspiration for a political philosophy that 
reflects  on  environmental  policies  is  not  only  a  possibility;  it  can  be  seen  as  a  relevant 
alternative to theories based on economical usefulness grounded on utility or efficiency. This 
is the case because the Kantian inspiration possesses a moral dimension for policies, and this 
stresses the right to the environment relative to other human rights. In the following section, I 
will outline the possible action of the State regarding the protection of natural resources. This 
is  compatible  with  liberal  Kantian  theory;  in  fact,  it  strengthens  it  through  the  notion  of 
human dignity itself. 
 
III. The Kantian Liberal State,  Public Policies and Environmental Protection. 
In Kantian contractualism legal duties do not change when one moves from the state of nature 
to the civil state. However, as Kant explains, public law creates the possibility of coexistence 
of freedoms overseen by private laws. The state of nature is insecure, and this is overcome 
with the rise of civil union. In this state of nature there is already human association, such as 
family or contract-based human association, for example. Thus, this right will continue to 
apply after the rise of political order. 
 
Yet, there is an unlimited exterior freedom in the state of nature. For this reason, this 
state  is  potentially  violent,  for  “no  one  is  sure  of  what  is  His  against  violence”.  Kant 
concludes that the first principle that man must decree is the abandonment of the state of 
nature and submission to an external limitation on which all agree, and the law establishes 
what is mine or what is yours. However, this state of nature is not (Hobbes notwithstanding) a 
state of violence and injustice, but a state of negative justice “in which should the law be 8 
controversial, there would not be a judge capable of dictating a legitimate sentence…”
10 The 
appearance of public law and the implied insertion in political society is not just the insertion 
into an internal political order (the State’s); it is also the insertion into international public law 
(which Kant calls people`s law)  and cosmopolitical law (which applies to citizens of the 
world). The social contract that grounds the institution of civil or political order differs from 
other kinds of contract: 
The union of many for some common end (that all of them have) is to be found in any social 
contract; but that union which is in itself an end (that each ought to have) and which is therefore 
the unconditional and first duty in any external relation of people in general, who cannot help 
mutually  affecting  one  another,  is to  be  found in  a  society  only  insofar  as  it  is in the  civil 
condition, that is, constitutes a commonwealth. 
11 
 
In Kant’s view, the aim of constituting the State is a duty and “the supreme formal 
condition” of all legal duties. Not only does it establish the belongings of every person, but it 
also protects one’s belongings against the intervention of others. The original contract is a 
rational idea, but a rational idea with a practical reality: it obliges all lawgivers to state its 
laws as coming from the collective will of a whole people. The legal state is established 
through a relation of subordination of citizens relative to the powers of the city. A contract 
whereby “everyone gives up their exterior freedom before the people to recover it later as a 
member of a republic, that is as members of a community or the people as a city” underlies 
the  aforementioned  legal  state.  In  The  Idea  of  a  universal  history  with  a  cosmopolitan 
purpose,  Kant  affirms  the  existence  of  a  natural  disposition  in  men  that  finds  its  full 
development  not  in  the  individual  but  rather  in  the  species  and  through  reason.  He  also 
affirms that all human strengths are awakened by the unsociable sociability of men, that is, 
their  tendency  to  form  a  society  that  must  contend  with  a  tendency  to  isolation  and 
domination. This opposition drives men to their first steps from brutality to culture, as the 
philosopher reminds us: thus, talents develop little by little, taste takes shape and, through 
continued  illustration,  the  beginning  becomes  the  foundation  for  a  mode  of  thought  that 
eventually  can  convert  the  crude  natural  disposition  into  a  natural  differentiation  that  is 
relative to determined practical principles. For this reason, says Kant, the greatest problem for 
humankind  is  the  establishment  of  a  civil  society  that  guarantees  the  rule  of  law  and, 
consequently, allows natural dispositions to flourish. 
                                                           
10 See Kant (note 9), .8:289-290. 
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11 See Kant (note 9), 8:290. 9 
The rational imperative that allows men to overcome the unsociable sociability of their 
state of nature does not, however, impel society to an unspecified political order. Men are 
driven to form a constitutional order that allows reason to overcome through law all kinds of 
legislation that are inherited from tradition, custom and prejudice. Two years later, in Toward 
Perpetual Peace, these principles are repeated almost word for word in the statement of the 
basic values of a republican constitution. The principles that will regulate this “civil state” are 
1. The freedom of each member of the society as a man 2. His equality before all others as a 
subject 3. The independence (or autonomy) of each member of a community as a citizen”. 
The Kantian republican state is based on two key principles: the principle of separation of 
powers and the principle of popular sovereignty combined with political representation. 
Civil and political freedom both presuppose that none can be obliged to be happy in their 
own way, “but each person is allowed to pursue happiness as they see fit, as long as this does 
not limit the freedom of others to seek a similar goal, and its coexistence with each person’s 
freedom is possible, in accordance with a possible universal law.”
12 The philosopher says that 
the  State  should  not  decide  how  citizens  can  find  happiness.  Kant  criticizes  a  “paternal 
government” as the worst kind of despotism, which is unlike a “patriotic government”, where 
the rights of the State are assured by laws that express a common will. Civil and political 
freedom are implied, because a despotic State that violates individuality and imposes its own 
conception of the common good is avoided by the participation of citizens in the making of 
political will.
13 It must be noted, however, that this does not imply denying that the state can 
have a role in welfare policies. Indeed, Kant himself acknowledges the need for such policies 
if  they  are  indispensable  for  the  affirmation  of  the  values  themselves  of  a  republican 
constitution. This affirmation ensures the survival of the legal state and the communit y of 
citizens: 
Certain restrictions on imports are included among these laws, so that the means of acquiring 
livelihood  will  promote  the  subjects’  interests  and  not  the  advantage  of  foreigners  or 
encouragement of other’s industry, since a state, without the prosperity of the people, would not 
possess enough strength to resist foreign enemies or to maintain itself as a commonwealth.
14 
 
As far as this point in particular is concerned, an excerpt is worth mentioning from the 
Doctrine of Right, the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant affirms that the 
                                                           
12 Imannuel Kant, ,  Teoria e Prática. In  À Paz Perpétua e outros opúsculos, 1997, 75 
13 It is worth comparing this excerpt of Kantian theory with some contemporary political theories, such as Jürgen 
Habermas’, and his purpose of placing his political theory between liberalism and communitarianism. The 
articulation of civil freedom and political freedom in Kant’s theory highlights the possibility of bringing the 
question of freedom to the State’s organization.  
14 See Kant (note8), 8:299. 10 
rich must contribute toward the sustenance of the poor, which implies state action with this 
purpose: 
The  general  will  of  the  people  has  united  itself  into  a  society  which  is  to  maintain  itself 
perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in order to 
maintain those members of the society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of 
state the government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of 
sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs. 
15 
         
Civil equality is reflected in equality among citizens; privileges are not justified, for each 
member of this whole must be able to reach any stage of their condition (that can be obtained 
by a subject) that is made possible by their talents, their activity and their fortune. When 
referring  to  civil  independence,  Kant  says  citizens  must  not  be  dependent  in  a  way  that 
precludes their participation, regardless of the will of others, in the community. Even so, 
passive citizens have a right in the civil state: as Kant explain, whatever their purpose, they 
must never be contrary to natural freedom and this proportional equality of everything that 
allows everyone to work and thus evolve from a passive condition to an active one. 
The aforementioned political theory makes it possible to think of the role of the State 
relative to the implementation of environmental law. This applies both to current citizens and 
future ones. As Gillroy reminds us, a just State would be a necessary condition (even if not a 
sufficient one) for establishing a “Realm of Ends”, and these conditions certainly include an 
environment that is conducive to mankind’s moral and political enhancement. While political 
justice distributes freedom, nature is the environment where mankind’s best features can be 
achieved. Consequently, public policies meant to protect and preserve the environment are 
possible. Kant wrote about the “Realm of Ends” as the only consideration of human moral 
choices, but he also wrote about a “Kingdom of Nature” that exists in perfect harmony with 
the former, and is indispensable for the supreme being of the human condition. Kant proposes 
a new harmony between nature and culture that is to be reached with the adoption of a perfect 
political Constitution. As suggested by Gillroy, in today’s terms one could use this Kantian 
relationship between political morals and nature to state that “…Humanity alone has both the 
moral capacity and the strategic rationality to express freedom responsibly and to innovate or 
adapt itself so that interdependence with the environment can persist over time and establish 
the harmony of human and natural realms.”
16Thus, respecting nature does not mean stopping 
the  use  of  natural  resources,  which  would  be  impossible.  Respecting  nature  means 
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16 John Martin Gillroy. Justice&Nature – Kantian Philosophy,Environmental Policy & The Law,  2001, 191. 11 
recognizing its existence as a system that is by itself capable of and directed to perfection, 
regardless of human choices. 
 
Gillroy reminds us that the state of nature in Kant is not characterized by the famous 
“prisoner`s dilemma”; it is rather an “assurance game”. In other words, the question begged 
by the state of nature is not the definition of interests in a community. Instead, it is the lack of 
security for citizen rights that an absence of civil order would bring, since such rights are not 
grounded in a contract; instead, they are grounded on human reason itself. Thus, the political 
system  resulting  from  the  Kantian  contract,  where  there  exists  a  principle  of  distributive 
justice,  making  a  fair  political  society  arise  that  assures  the  moral  disposition  of  each 
individual will not be affected or exploited by the behavior of the others (taken by other 
reasons for their actions, other than their moral disposition). This means not just a simple 
conjugation of private interests that public decision-makers must consider; those who manage 
public policies must strive to implement policies that actually promote the moral value of a 
given policy: 
It is therefore critical that the decision maker, basing policy recommendations on the Kantian 
paradigm of public choice, be cognizant that his or her understanding of how the rules of the 
political  game  and  his  or  her  subsequent  decisions  are  construed  will  influence  how  the 
individual perceives the strategic environment and subsequently influence with iterated game one 
plays, given this context. The power of the policy maker is not just to assume the assurance game 
but to support its play by avoiding decisions that place stress on the individual actor to change 
her goals or forsake her complex practical reason for a simpler and pure rationality where moral 
imperatives,  intrinsic  value,  and  non-consequentialist  motives  becomes  difficult  and  one´s 
exercise of reason is purely rational event if focused on public/universal goals.
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A State that is just or legitimate will only materialize if an active government regulates 
and supports the welfare of its population with a structure that encourages basic material 
conditions  through  distributive  justice,  as  shown  by  Kant  in  his  defense  of  policies  of 
assistance  for  the  poor.  Since  the  reasons  that  feed  the  practice  of  freedom  and  civil 
independence  do  matter,  a  State  that  is  “patriotic”  while  not  “paternalistic”  must  adopt 
welfare policies. The latter allows free agents to make choices in conditions of formal and 
material equality. Consequently, these policies must often count on institutions that regulate 
political choices beforehand. This would avoid the grounding of political choices uniquely on 
criteria of economic rationality or the arbitrary preferences of the relevant individuals. From 
                                                           
17 See Gillroy, 275. 12 
the viewpoint of the imperative of preservation of human freedom through the protection of 
natural  systems,  in  which  the  natural  system  and  the  human  one  both  contribute  to  the 
Ecosystem, two consequences can be identified. Firstly, all public choices must value the 
protection  of  the  environment  in  its  interface  with  mankind  and  its  needs  and  desires. 
Secondly, mankind should be responsible for understanding how natural systems work in 
order to define our rights relative to them and observe these rights in collective human action 
itself. Another Kantian concept might be relevant here, namely, the public use of reason, 
which allows one to  discuss  public norms that evolve in  conjunction  with  environmental 
issues  and differ from  a certain  feeling of ecological  urgency that characterizes  a certain 
current “ecologism”, as Bjarne Melkevik says
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